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As several of the articles in this issue have emphasized, the far-reaching 
consequences of globalization have elicited widespread concern—about the 
large disparities in the wealth of nations, the environmental despoliation ensuing 
from transnational^ unregulated disease and pollution, and the social problems 
created by global flows of capital and people. Most prominent among these 
concerns, however, is whether transnational institutions can be constructed or 
reconstructed to ensure that such borderless problems can be addressed and 
controlled democratically.1 
Reflection upon appropriate models of global democracy requires rethinking 
basic issues of citizenship and its education. Such discourse is charged with 
controversy because globalization and democracy are contested concepts whose 
meanings vary with the moral and political orientations of the participants.2 So 
too, reflection on the implications of globalization for education, as the two 
collections of essays under review here make clear, is rooted in conflicting 
orientations and varies with the operative conceptions of globalization and 
democracy. 
Whether positioned on the political right or the political left, a global 
consciousness and sensitivity have transformed discourse on educational policy 
in the advanced capitalist nations of the West. There is a general recognition that 
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intensified global interdependence requires a rethinking of purpose, curricula, 
pedagogy, governance, and professional development at all levels of education. 
Such recognition has emerged in the last decade as part of a burgeoning 
literature on globalization. As late as the mid-1980s, the purpose of education was 
bounded by preparation for life and work in the nation-state.3 For example, 
despite explicit recognition of intensified global economic competition, the most 
influential educational policy statement of the 1980s, A Nation At Risk: The 
Imperative For Educational Reform, recommended changes motivated more by 
national economic imperatives than by global concerns.4 
Even progressive statements of the 1980s reflected a nation-centered focus. 
In their history of public education in the United States, David Tyack and 
Elisabeth Hansot argued that the kind of education we want for our children 
reflects the kind of society we want to live in. "A commitment to a common school 
starts with . . . beliefs about what sort of society America should become," they 
wrote. "That is really what most discourse on purpose is about in education: a 
preferred future expressed as a particular kind of training for the young."5 Tyack 
and Hansot echoed John Dewey's maxim in Democracy and Education that "the 
conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning 
until we define the kind of society we have in mind."6 They also share with Dewey 
a common recognition of connections between education and political purpose 
broadly construed. 
As a social process and function," Dewey views education as a pivotal site 
for the reproduction of any regime or society. Education serves to cultivate skills 
and capacities, qualities of character, and habits of mind that enable members of 
a society to live and work in a manner that maintains its definitive economic, 
political, and cultural features. Nevertheless, education is not exclusively a 
conservative force. Latent within education as a socially reproductive process is 
a progressive possibility. For Dewey, taking this possibility seriously requires a 
move from the sociology of education to sociologically informed political theory. 
Tyack and Hansot agree. 
In the seventh chapter of Democracy and Education Dewey constructs a 
substantive ideal of strong democracy, characterizing it as "a mode of associated 
living"—a way of life as opposed to merely "a form of government"—juxtapos-
ing it to the weak and increasingly elitist democracy in the class-divided society 
of his day. Existing educational institutions, Dewey argued, must cultivate the 
competencies of citizenship, communication, and "associated living" that strong 
democracy requires.7 This is a tall order because while the schools must equip 
people to flourish in the existing society, they must also cultivate capacities that 
will enable them to create a more authentically democratic one. 
It is important to recognize that global processes and recent discourse about 
their meaning do not make local and nation-centered educational policy obsolete. 
More to the point, they do not make the normative concerns of Dewey, Tyack, and 
Hansot irrelevant. As Tyack and Larry Cuban argue in their book, Tinkering With 
Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform, "a vision of a just democracy... has 
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marked the best discourse about educational purpose [in America] over the past 
century" and it should continue to do so.8 What globalization and the attending 
discourse about it have done, however, is stimulate a restructuring of educational 
institutions and a reframing of educational policy—at least among university 
educators, think tanks, and national policy makers. Just as these impacts have 
elicited a reformulation of conservative discourse on education, so too they 
require a reframing of progressive and more radical educational objectives, 
including a rethinking of the scope and essential conditions of "a just democracy." 
The notion of "reframing" is appropriate here because it connotes not only the 
incorporation of something new, but also significant continuity with older forms 
of theory and practice. 
Public education, Michael Apple asserts in his contribution to Globalization 
and Education, serves "as a proxy for larger battles over what our institutions 
should do, whom they should serve, and who should make the decision."9 Apple 
builds on David Labaree's periodization of educational reform in American high 
schools that identifies a tension between two general political orientations in each 
era. One of these "elevates liberty and promotes free markets," while the other, 
Labaree writes, "elevates equality and promotes participatory politics."10 Labaree' s 
analysis can be broadened by subsuming these orientations into contending 
models of democracy in which liberty, equality, and justice have different 
meanings: "weak democracy," which is elitist, market-friendly, government-
centered and characterized by a relatively passive citizenry, and "strong democ-
racy," a model envisioning a broad democratization of society that requires a 
more substantive and active form of citizenship, and regulates economic activity 
to ensure greater equality among citizens.11 Each period of educational reform has 
involved reframing these contested models in response to a changing economic 
and political environment. Coincident with this theoretical and rhetorical refine-
ment is a political struggle—with public schools in the middle—to determine 
which vision will be hegemonic. 
In recent years heightened sensitivity to globalization and cultural diversity 
have set in motion yet another round of reframing—not only with respect to 
education, as the two books under review make clear, but also with respect to 
democracy. Weak and elitist models of global democracy contend with more 
substantive and participatory models in the globalization literature. In line with 
Dewey, Tyack, and Hansot—but now on a grander scale—the ideal of global 
democracy, however construed, requires a reframing of educational purpose. 
Globalization and Education 
The essays in Globalization and Education and Universities and Globalization 
take up the issue of educational purpose. The subtitle for both books, Critical 
Perspectives, is appropriate because both reject neoliberal (free-market) interpre-
tations of globalization, the discourse of educational purpose and policy rooted 
in these interpretations, and the restructuring of educational institutions occurring 
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around the world as a result. Several of the essays are constructive insofar as they 
identify sites of resistance to neoliberalism. Some of these sites—human rights, 
environmental protection, gender, and labor issues—have inspired substantive 
conceptions of global democracy and citizenship. For the most part, however, the 
essays in these two collections do not flesh out a preferred model of global 
democracy or a conception of educational purpose commensurate with it. 
In Global Transformations David Held and his colleagues have surveyed a 
huge quantity of literature on globalization and distinguish "three broad schools 
of thought" that they have labeled "hyperglobalists," "sceptics," and 
"transformationists." Each school differs with respect to its "conceptualization" 
of globalization and its conclusions regarding the "causal dynamics," "implica-
tions for state power and governance," "socio-economic consequences," and 
"historical trajectory" of contemporary global process.12 Analysis of each school 
is unnecessary, but the depiction of the transformationists is relevant because the 
interpretations of globalization in both books under review fall within this camp: 
At the heart of the transformationist thesis is a conviction that, 
at the dawn of a new millennium, globalization is a central 
driving force behind the rapid social, political, and economic 
changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order. 
. . . According to [its] proponents . . . contemporary processes 
of globalization are historically unprecedented such that gov-
ernments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to 
a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between 
international and domestic, external and internal affairs... ,13 
The five criteria used to differentiate the schools of globalization theory 
are also useful for understanding the critical perspective that informs both 
collections. 
Conceptualization 
Both Globalization and Education and Universities and Globalization view 
globalization as a set of socio-economic, political, cultural, and environmental 
processes.14 For the most part, however, they focus on the economic and cultural 
aspects of globalization and their impact upon educational institutions and policy. 
Both books recognize a distinction between global processes and their current 
impact, on the one hand, and discourse about them, on the other.15 This is 
important because many of the authors attack not only the neoliberal version of 
globalization, but also the proposed and existing restructuring of education 
around the world defended on neoliberal grounds.16 Equally important is the 
conviction that the future of globalization is an open, politically mediated 
process. So far as economic globalization is concerned, what David Coates calls 
"market-led capitalism"—celebrated by neoliberalism—may currently be ascen-
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dant. But the future of globalization is a political project "and not just a 
spontaneous cascade of natural market flows" to which all national governments 
must conform.17 To the contrary, there are international organizations, social 
movements, and progressive possibilities in an emerging global civil society 
whose potential for shaping the trajectory of globalization in more humane and 
democratic directions has not, as yet, been sufficiently recognized or realized.18 
Causal Dynamics 
Unlike the discussion in Global Transformations, there is no extended 
treatment of causation in the two collections under review. Nevertheless, critical 
analyses contained in these books suggest conclusions regarding the most 
important factors shaping globalization today. When global processes—as dis-
tinct from global discourse—are the focus, the assumption is that global capital-
ism is the principle force driving other global social and cultural processes. In the 
language of Global Transformations, global capitalism is the "site of power [that] 
becomes to a degree the source of power" in other domains.19 When the focus is 
upon theoretical, policy-oriented, and popular global discourse, essays in both 
collections recognize the dominance of neoliberalism.20 These structural and 
discursive phenomena are linked insofar as neoliberalism is the well-financed, 
ideological arm of global capitalism.21 It is important to outline the substance of 
this ideology because it both drives and justifies current retrenchment of welfare 
states, privatization of public services (including education), and the restructur-
ing of educational institutions and practices. 
Janice Dudley in Universities and Globalization and Michael Apple in 
Globalization and Education provide similar analyses of neoliberal discourse. In 
her essay "Globalization and Education Policy in Australia," Dudley constructs 
a synopsis of a neoliberal "grand narrative of economic globalization" that she 
characterizes as a "master discourse of uncontrollable global market forces that 
valorizes the economic rationality of neo-classical economics and the minimalist 
politics of neoliberalism." This narrative embraces 
a form of economic fundamentalism, an absolutist closed 
discourse that valorizes "the market"—an international capi-
talist marketplace of free trade, unfettered by national regula-
tion. It is this neutral global market that becomes the para-
mount organizing principle to which all societies must become 
subject.22 
In an argument that presupposes the distinction between empirical phe-
nomena and the contested interpretations to which they give rise, Dudley 
contends that this narrative mediated the response of the Australian gov-
ernment to economic globalization during the 1980s and 1990s. Depending 
upon the politics of the administration in power, two strategies were fol-
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lowed. One strategy "emphasize[d] . . . markets, labor market flexibility 
(through lower labor costs), efficiency, . . . deregulation, privatization, and 
managerialism," Dudley writes, "while [the other emphasized] a high-skill/ 
high wage route to national prosperity . . . characterized by . . . value-
added innovative production and market flexibility through multiskilling."23 
For both strategies, however, "education was but an element of the micro-
economy, with the role of providing skilled workers . . ."24 At its core, 
education was to be vocational training; the rest was fluff. A key differ-
ence between the strategies was in the role of the state, with the first 
pushing for retrenchment of social services and reduced spending for edu-
cation, and the second combining welfare retrenchment with the recogni-
tion of public education and skills-training as a national investment.25 
In his essay Michael Apple identifies two variations of American 
neoliberalism that are virtually identical to the Australian strategies Dudley 
describes. Apple has studied the "right turn" in American politics—now 
more than two decades in the making.26 Calling it the "conservative resto-
ration," he identifies four factions of this "broad-based alliance": 
neoliberalism, neoconservatism, authoritarian populism, and a faction com-
posed of the "upwardly mobile new middle class." However, neoliberalism 
and neoconservatism are his principal concerns, and he places them at the 
forefront of public school reform in America. Neoliberalism is the more 
powerful voice.27 The essential difference between its two variants consists 
of one being more insistent on advocating the commodification of educa-
tion; that is to say, "placing schools themselves into the market" so that 
they are subject to the alleged beneficial effects of market competition.28 
By contrast, the other variation is willing to spend more on public educa-
tion so long as it addresses the needs of business.29 
Aside from this difference, Apple argues, neoliberals are united on a 
number of ideas. With distant intellectual roots in classical utilitarianism, 
and recent ties to theories of mainstream economics and rational choice, 
neoliberals see human beings as self-interested, acquisitive, and bent on 
maximizing benefits to themselves. This view of agency is coupled with a 
belief in the fairness and efficiency of politically unregulated markets as 
the quintessential institution for allocating and distributing income, goods, 
and services. They rigidly bifurcate "public" and "private," with the former 
being the sphere of government and the latter being the sphere of the 
family, the economy, and the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 
The purpose of government is to protect the autonomy of the private 
sphere with a minimum of interference in the lives of families, the man-
agement of business enterprises, the operation of markets, and the exercise 
of rights.30 
Drawing upon the work of feminist philosopher Nancy Fraser, Apple 
views neoliberalism as both a "reprivatizing" and "depoliticizing" dis-
course. In dismantling the welfare state, neoliberals desire to shrink a 
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public sphere that has expanded since the Progressive Era while reclaiming 
(reprivatizing) and expanding the private sphere of individual choice and 
free markets. Reprivatizing discourse is also depoliticizing because it 
shrinks the scope of public policy. For example, by commodifying educa-
tion and allowing market competition among providers to be the arbiter of 
social utility, the "irrationality" of politics is removed from decisions about 
education.31 
These features of neoliberalism—acquisitive individualism, valorization 
of the private sphere at the expense of the public, and distaste for poli-
tics—are incorporated into a weak and elitist model of nation-centered de-
mocracy. Of all the essays in Globalization and Education and Universities 
and Globalization, Apple's piece is most sensitive to this neoliberal model. 
It is a market model of democracy in which the practice of citizenship is 
subsumed under the metaphor of consumption and "'consumer choice' [in 
both the political and economic marketplace] is the guarantor of democ-
racy." Political parties and politicians are "entrepreneurs" who periodically 
advertise menus of policies and compete for power. Citizens as consum-
ers—"deraced, declassed, and degendered"—choose which set of elites and 
policies best serve their interests.32 After voting in the political market-
place, citizens are expected to resume a stance of political passivity as 
they pursue their private lives and allow elected officials to do their jobs. 
There is both continuity and discontinuity between this neoliberal, 
market model of democracy and elitist models that prevailed among pro-
gressive liberals (including educational administrators) before the turn to 
the right in American politics in the 1970s.33 Progressive elitists disparaged 
the political competence and rationality of ordinary citizens; they believed 
in the insulation of policy formation from the hurly-burly of mass politics; 
and they reduced democracy to the election and accountability of public 
officials. The contrast with neoliberalism lies in the belief of progressive 
elitists in a more substantial array of public goods and services, including 
education, modest macromanagement of the economy, and greater faith in 
policy experts than in unregulated markets. Of course there is also a strain 
of progressive liberalism in the United States that embraces a more sub-
stantive and social democratic model.34 Both strains of progressive liberal-
ism, however, have been pushed by the "conservative restoration" to the 
margins in recent American political life. 
Neoliberalism confines democracy to the nation-state.35 It considers the 
global economy a vast private sector inhospitable and off-bounds to politi-
cal interference. If any regulation or economic coordination is required, it 
should be conducted by international organizations dedicated to the expan-
sion of global capitalism, insulated from democratic publics, and commit-
ted to the economic and political principles of neoliberalism.36 
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Implications For State Power and Governance 
Recent literature on contemporary globalization has raised serious questions 
about the autonomy of national governments in a global environment of unregu-
lated capital mobility and financial markets.37 With respect to advanced capitalist 
nations, these questions focus on the capacity of their governments to shape the 
quality of life in their own societies. At stake is the future of the welfare state in 
which education as a public good is a definitive component. The future of public 
education in these societies, therefore, depends upon the continuing capacity of 
their governments to distribute public goods and services and to regulate 
economic activity in the interest of the common welfare. As their titles indicate, 
the purpose of the collections of essays under review is to reflect upon the 
implications of globalization for education. Both books recognize, however, that 
global impacts upon educational policy and institutions are mediated through the 
state and through the political struggles to control its policies. 
Is the welfare state in serious trouble because of globalization? The response 
in these books is a qualified yes. Qualifications are in order, they argue, because 
it is necessary to differentiate between the structural impacts of economic 
globalization, on the one hand, and policy initiatives of global and domestic, 
neoliberal economic and political elites, on the other. Equally important, the 
response of a welfare state to economic globalization depends upon the type of 
welfare state it is, its place in the economic and political pecking order in the 
community of nations, and the political salience of neoliberalism in its own 
internal politics.38 
So what has been the actual impact of economic globalization upon welfare 
states? First, as many commentators have argued, international capital mobility, 
intensified global competition, unpredictable exchange rates, and the agendas of 
private and quasi-public international trade and financial institutions have se-
verely diminished, if not destroyed, the prospects of Keynesian demand manage-
ment either as a catalyst of national economic growth or as the redistributive 
foundation of the welfare state.39 Second, corporate restructuring, a significant 
increase in female employment during the last thirty years, and the phenomenon 
of "deindustrialization" have transformed not only labor markets but also the 
structure of needs toward which services and public goods delivered by welfare 
states are directed.40 Neoliberal global economic policies and multinational 
business practices since the early-1970s have created a world order in which the 
"Keynesian Welfare State," as it was constructed during the postwar years of 
unprecedented economic growth, is (or is fast becoming) obsolete.41 
Soci-economic Consequences 
Essays in Globalization and Education and Universities and Education 
indicate a keen awareness of globalization-induced inequalities of wealth and 
power within and among the nations of the world, of new forms of social 
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exclusion, of corporate restructuring and shifts in the structure of global labor 
markets, and of the cultural impact of dramatic changes in satellite and computer 
technologies. Some of the essays recognize resistance to globalization and 
differentiate between "tribalist" and xenophobic forms and those that reject 
neoliberal globalization while embracing a cosmopolitan point of view (e. g., 
human rights and environmental organizations).42 
As their titles indicate, however, their main focus is upon the impact of 
globalization on education. Some of the essays analyze impacts in technologi-
cally advanced nations; others look at developing countries. For the most part, 
these writers acknowledge that national responses to global pressures of one kind 
or another are not uniform. Responses with respect to education are shaped by 
indigenous cultural traditions, institutional inertia, and the politics of policy 
elites.43 
Most of the essays in these books are concerned with neoliberal policy 
initiatives and the resulting institutional changes. Some speak briefly to the 
normative issue of what kind of education is appropriate in this increasingly 
global society. These normative considerations will be considered in the conclud-
ing part of the essay. For now the implications of neoliberalism will be the focus, 
and it is therefore imperative to distinguish between neoliberal proposals for 
reform and the actual institutional restructuring that may result; "policy state-
ments, position papers, and . . . the pronouncements of... . economically and 
politically powerful lobby groups do not leap from the page directly into material 
reality."44 
Both books focus on "the economic effects of globalization which tend to 
force national educational policies into a neoliberal framework that emphasizes 
lower taxes, shrinking the state sector,... promoting market approaches to school 
choice," installing corporate models of management, and instituting closer ties 
between the schools and business.45 Within this framework, both books, but 
primarily Universities and Globalization, document the rise of "academic capi-
talism" and the shift in funding toward the natural sciences and applied research 
in higher education.46 This framework, as they both document, affects not only 
technologically advanced nations but also developing countries. Neoliberal 
"structural adjustment programs" introduced into Third World countries by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have constricted the funding of education 
and narrowed educational objectives. Adoption of educational initiatives pro-
moted by the Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the World Bank have had similar effects in Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, 
and other countries.47 
Trajectories 
As discussed previously, the authors in Globalization and Education and 
Universities and Globalization reject the notion of historical inevitability. 
Globalization, they argue, is a political project whose future is unpredictable. 
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Neoliberalism to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no singular trajectory 
immanent within contemporary globalization. Various paths of development are 
possible. Janice Dudley concludes her contribution to Universities and 
Globalization by asserting: 
There are alternative visions of the future [sustained by 
transnational social movements] . . . where capital is 
social, rather than solely financial or economic, and 
where community and human priorities take precedence 
over those of the market . . .—vision[s] concerned with 
human, social, and ecological sustainability, rather than 
competitive international capitalism.48 
While the editors of Globalization and Education reject the neoliberal 
vision of the future, they are more somber than Dudley about progressive 
possibilities. They raise two questions. The first is 
whether, given the decreasing role and influence of the 
nation-state in unilaterally determining domestic policies, 
and given the fiscal crisis of public revenues in most so-
cieties, there will be a corresponding decline in the state's 
commitment to educational opportunity and equality, or 
whether there will simply be a greater turn toward the 
market, privatization, and choice models that regard the 
public as consumers who will only obtain the education 
they can afford. 
The second question revolves around 
governability in the face of increasing diversity (and in-
creased awareness of diversity), permeable borders and an 
explosion of worldwide mobility, and media and technol-
ogy that create wholly new conditions shaping affiliation 
and identification. 
"Nothing less is at stake," they conclude, "than the survival of . . . demo-
cratic . . . governance and the role of public education in that enterprise."49 
Possible trajectories of globalization are an important concern of Held 
and his co-authors in Global Transformations. And, like the editors of 
Globalization and Education, they are troubled by the prospects of weak-
ened national democratic governance in a context of international global 
pressures. Unlike these editors, however, Held and his colleagues broach 
the subject of global democracy as a nurturing environment for a revital-
ization of democracy within the nation-state. The Asian economic crisis of 
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the late-1990s, they argue, has had the effect of making neoliberal 
globalization problematic. Several possible trajectories are reasonable: 
from a shift to a more highly regulated form of 
globalization, through a form of thin globalization (as 
protectionism, exclusionary regionalism, and nationalism 
gain the upper hand), to a more predatory form of 
neoliberal economic globalization. . . .50 
These authors link the project of creating a global democracy to the first 
of these trajectories 
Refraining Democracy and Education 
The editors and the authors in both Globalization and Education and 
Universities and Globalization recognize, with considerable trepidation, that 
unregulated globalization has led to a retrenchment and, in some cases, disman-
tling of the welfare state—developments celebrated by neoliberalism. Their 
principle concern is for the future of public education and for a conception of 
educational purpose that is broader than that envisioned in neoliberal educational 
policy. As strong democrats, they desire an education that coheres with a more 
substantive democracy than currently exists; and the social democrats among 
them recognize that strong democracy requires that citizens enjoy a variety of 
social protections and services (including education) that only a welfare state can 
provide. The challenge for this moral and political orientation, however, goes 
beyond current welfare state retrenchment to a restructuring of the welfare state 
itself, including a restructuring of educational institutions and practices.51 The 
essays in the books under review only hint at what a restructured education might 
look like. 
As a host of scholars recognize, however, reconstruction of the welfare state 
requires a global environment that will return some autonomy to the nation-state. 
Clearly, unregulated neoliberal globalization does not provide such an environ-
ment. But, as Held and his co-authors argue, "globalization is not, nor has it ever 
been, beyond regulation and control."52 The political project for progressive 
liberals, social democrats, environmentalists, and cultural pluralists is to bring 
global processes under some form of democratic control. 
The justification for global democracy does not rest solely on its being a 
condition for strengthening national democracies or reconstructing the welfare 
state. It also rests in the increasing extent to which "socio-economic processes, 
and outcomes of decisions about them, stretch beyond national frontiers."53 Some 
form of global democracy is justified because the locus of economic and political 
power, and the global consequences of its exercise, transcend institutions of 
public accountability within national boundaries. Finally, some form of global 
democratic regulation and control is justified because national polities confront 
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problems—communicable diseases, global warming, crime, nuclear waste, mi-
gration, to name a few—that transcend territorial boundaries. For all of these 
reasons, "the nature of political community . . . [and] how . . . the proper 
boundaries of a political community [should] be drawn in a more regional and 
global order [is at stake] ,"54 What would it mean to speak of the world as a political 
community? What would global democracy look like? 
In parallel accounts, Andrew McGrew in The Transformation of Democracy 
and the co-authors (including McGrew) of Global Transformations outline three 
schools of thought that address these questions. They label these schools "liberal-
internationalist," "radical communitarian," and "cosmopolitan democracy." The 
project of each of these schools is normative and theoretical. Their purpose is to 
construct viable models of global democracy. None of these schools is wildly 
Utopian because each believes that it grounds its model in existing institutions, 
political traditions, and possibilities immanent within existing political and social 
trends. Each model entails a compatible conception of citizenship. None of these 
schools recommends the creation of a world government.55 
There is a fault line, however, between the liberal-internationalists and the 
other two schools. With minimal regulation of the global economy, liberal-
internationalists seek "to transpose a weak form of liberal democracy into a model 
of democratic world order." Like their classical liberal forbears, they "separate 
the economic from the political and restrict democracy to the political sphere."56 
Theirs is a model of global democracy that expects little from ordinary citizens. 
Indeed, it represents a refraining of the progressive elitist model of democracy 
outlined above. 
By contrast, radical communitarians and cosmopolitan democrats draw upon 
traditions of participatory democracy, civic republicanism, and democratic 
socialism. Both schools are committed to substantive democratization of the 
private as well as the public spheres. The difference between them is that the 
cosmopolitans make a more explicit case for the global rule of "democratic law." 
The core of cosmopolitan democracy 
involves reconceiving legitimate political authority in a man-
ner which disconnects it from its traditional anchor in fixed 
borders and delimited territories and, instead, articulates it as 
an attribute of basic democratic arrangements or basic demo-
cratic law which can, in principle, be entrenched and drawn on 
in diverse self-regulating associations—from cities and 
subnational regions, to nation-states, regions and wider global 
networks.57 
In this global reframing of strong democracy, both radical communitarians and 
cosmopolitan democrats recognize a kind of "world citizenship" in which 
individuals "can fall within the jurisdiction of several authorities; they can have 
A Global Challenge 387 
multiple identities and they need not be united by [national] social bonds which 
make them indifferent to, or enemies of, the rest of the human race."58 
Neither collection of essays under review speaks to the issue of global 
democracy. Universities and Globalization strays little from showing how 
neoliberal policy initiatives have shaped the restructuring of higher education 
around the world. The agenda of Globalization and Education is broader and the 
essays are more diverse. The introductory essay by Nicholas Burbules and Carlos 
Torres and the following essay by Raymon Morrow and Torres acknowledge the 
need to develop a conception of "world," or "cosmopolitan," or "multicultural 
democratic" citizenship.59 Burbules and Torres ask how multicultural education 
designed to teach people to respect differences within diverse societies might be 
extended to "a global order in which the gulf of differences becomes wider, the 
sense of interdependence and common interest more attenuated, and the ground-
ing of affiliation more abstract and indirect (if it exists at all)."60 In addition to 
these explicit references to a global form of citizenship, Globalization and 
Education includes an excellent piece by Burbules entitled "Does the Internet 
Constitute a Global Educational Community?" that could be helpful in develop-
ing the educational implications of the radical communitarian and cosmopolitan 
models of global democracy.61 
Such a project would reframe the connections that Dewey, Tyack, and 
Hansot see between visions of a good society and educational purpose. It is a 
project that is currently at a very initial stage. Strong democrats can begin their 
reflections on the educational implications of a preferred model of global 
democracy, such as those proposed by David Held or Richard Falk, by reading 
Carlos Torres' s Democracy, Education, andMulticulturalism\ MarthaNussbaum' s 
Cultivating Humanity, and, for professional education, William Sullivan's Work 
and Integrity.62 
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